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IS THE PRICE RIGHT FOR SANCTUARY CITIES?

Juliana Canevascini*
I. INTRODUCTION
Eleven states and a growing list of localities self-identify as
sanctuary jurisdictions after implementing immigration policies
that affect how state and local officials interact with federal
immigration officers.1 States and localities enact sanctuary
policies to encourage more trusting and cooperative relationships
between law enforcement and undocumented members of the
community.2 Through these governments supporting these
relationships, undocumented immigrants may feel more
comfortable cooperating with police and reporting crimes. 3
United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”)
oppose these policies because the agency believes that they
interfere with the cooperation between federal immigration
officers and state officials. 4
ICE asserts that releasing
undocumented immigrants threatens communities and
cooperation between federal and state officers is necessary for
* J.D. Candidate, Seton Hall University School of Law, 2022. Bachelor of Arts in
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my mentor when I interned with the Office of the Principal Legal Advisor within
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1
Jessica M. Vaughan & Bryan Griffith, Map: Sanctuary Cities, Counties, and
States, CTR. FOR IMMIGR. STUD. (Mar. 22, 2021), https://cis.org/Map-SanctuaryCities-Counties-and-States.
2
See City of Chicago v. Barr, 961 F.3d 882, 918 (7th Cir. 2020); City of
Providence v. Barr, 954 F.3d 23, 30 (1st Cir. 2020); City of Phila. v. Att’y Gen. of
the U.S., 916 F.3d 276, 282 (3d Cir. 2019).
3 City of Providence, 954 F.3d at 30.
4
DHS, ICE Announce Arrests of More Than 170 At-large Aliens in Sanctuary
Jurisdictions, U.S. IMMIGR. AND CUSTOMS ENF’T (Oct. 16, 2020),

https://www.ice.gov/news/releases/dhs-ice-announce-arrests-more-170-large-alienssanctuary-jurisdictions [hereinafter DHS].
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ensuring public safety.5
Both sides of this contested debate raise valid points in
defense of their respective positions. Several studies show that
sanctuary jurisdictions are safer and have more positive economic
indicators than non-sanctuary jurisdictions. 6 A 2017 report by
the Center for American Progress found that, on average, thirtyfive-and-one-half fewer crimes were committed for every 10,000
people in jurisdictions that disregard ICE detainers compared to
jurisdictions that honor them. 7 Additionally, the study found that
these jurisdictions have lower poverty rates, higher employment
rates, and lower reliance on public assistance programs than nonsanctuary jurisdictions.8 A study in 2020 by Proceedings of the
National Academy of Sciences concluded that “sanctuary policies,
although effective at reducing deportations, do not threaten
public safety.” 9 While these studies do not provide definitive
proof that sanctuary policies should be standard practice, they do
support the proposition that communities are not negatively
impacted by these immigration policies.
By contrast, there are instances of criminal convictions and
pending criminal charges against undocumented immigrants
who were released after state or local officials failed to honor ICE
detainers due to sanctuary policies in place. 10 In November 2020,
Fernando De Jesus Lopez-Garcia, an undocumented immigrant,
stabbed five victims, injuring three and killing two, at a homeless
shelter where he was staying in San Jose, California. 11 Lopez5
6

Id.
Sanctuary Policies: An Overview, AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL, 4 (last accessed Oct.

2,
2021),
https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/
research/sanctuary_policies_an_overview.pdf [hereinafter Sanctuary Policies: An
Overview].
7
Sanctuary Policies: An Overview, supra note 6, at 4. A detainer is a written
request for state or local law enforcement to hold a detained individual for an extra
forty-eight hours after their release date so that federal immigration officials have
“time to decide whether to take the individual into federal custody.” Immigration
Detainers, ACLU (last visited Oct. 2, 2021), https://www.aclu.org/issues/immigrantsrights/ice-and-border-patrol-abuses/immigrationdetainers#:~:text=An%20ICE%20detainer%E2%80%94or%20%E2%80%9Cimmig
ration,into%20the%20federal%20deportation%20system.
8 Sanctuary Policies: An Overview, supra note 6, at 4.
9 Sanctuary Policies: An Overview, supra note 6, at 4.
10 See DHS, supra note 4.
11

UPDATE: Police Detail San Jose Church Stabbing Suspect’s Violent Criminal
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Garcia had prior convictions of assault with a deadly weapon and
felony domestic violence. 12 The police had previously arrested
Lopez-Garcia for misdemeanor domestic violence, resulting in
the issuance of an immigration detainer. 13 Due to California’s
sanctuary policies, the detainer was not honored and LopezGarcia was released from state custody without alerting ICE. 14
Instances like these attract media attention on account of the
divisive nature of sanctuary policies. Stories such as LopezGarcia’s trigger doubt and skepticism about the value and benefit
of sanctuary policies—even though these instances of criminal
behavior do not represent the vast majority of undocumented
immigrants living in the country.
In response to the lack of cooperation between state and
local jurisdictions and federal immigration officers, the Attorney
General put conditions on police funding grants for the 2017
fiscal year in an attempt to discourage jurisdictions from
establishing sanctuary policies. 15 There is currently a circuit split
that exists over whether the Attorney General is statutorily
authorized to implement three immigration-related conditions
on Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant Program
(“Byrne JAG”) funding. 16 These three conditions are referred to
as the Notice, Access, and Certification (or “Compliance”)
Conditions. 17 Jurisdictions that have implemented “sanctuary
policies” are especially at risk of losing the Byrne JAG grant
funding because their policies are not typically in compliance
History, Repeat Deportations, S.F. BAY AREA NEWS (Nov. 25, 2020),
https://sanfrancisco.cbslocal.com/2020/11/25/update-police-identify-san-josechurch-stabbing-suspect-detail-lengthy-criminal-history/.
Id.
Id.
14 Id.
15
Attorney General Sessions Announces Immigration Compliance
Requirements for Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant Programs, U.S.
12
13

DEP’T OF JUST. (July 25, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/attorney-generalsessions-announces-immigration-compliance-requirements-edward-byrnememorial.
16
See City & Cnty. of S.F. v. Barr, 965 F.3d 753 (9th Cir. 2020); City of
Chicago v. Barr, 961 F.3d 882 (7th Cir. 2020); City of Providence v. Barr, 954 F.3d
23 (1st Cir. 2020); New York v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 951 F.3d 84 (2d Cir. 2020); City
of Phila. v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 916 F.3d 276 (3d Cir. 2019).
17
SARAH HERMAN PECK, CONG. RSCH. SERV., LSB10126, DOJ GRANT
CONDITIONS TARGETING SANCTUARY JURISDICTIONS: LITIGATION UPDATE 1 (2018).

CANEVASCINI (DO NOT DELETE)

142

3/1/2022 8:49 AM

SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL

[Vol. 46:1

with these newly implemented conditions. Through analyzing
existing circuit precedent, this Comment explores whether the
Attorney General has the statutory authority to implement the
immigration conditions.
Part II of this Comment provides background information
on the history and current state of sanctuary jurisdictions in the
country, the Byrne JAG grant program itself, and the challenged
conditions imposed on Byrne JAG grant applications for fiscal
year 2017. Part III summarizes each circuit’s current position,
examines the reasoning behind the Third, First, Seventh, and
Ninth Circuits’ decisions to strike down the conditions, and the
Second Circuit’s contrary decision to uphold the challenged
conditions.
Part IV analyzes the circuits’ reasonings and
concludes that the Access and Notice Conditions are not
statutorily authorized through either the Byrne JAG statute itself
or through the assigned Assistant Attorney General duties statute.
Part IV also concludes that a provision of the Byrne JAG statute
authorizes the Certification Condition and permits the Attorney
General to require grant recipients to comply with 8 U.S.C.
§ 1373 because this provision qualifies as an “applicable Federal
law.” It will also look into the greater federalism concerns that
could become implicated by allowing this kind of statutory
interpretation.
II.

BACKGROUND

A. Sanctuary Jurisdictions
The term “sanctuary jurisdiction” refers to states and cities
that have enacted a range of measures limiting their
participation in the federal government’s enforcement of
immigration law. 18
The utilization of sanctuary policies
originated from the response of a network of religious
organizations that offered assistance to a wave of nearly one
million Salvadoran and Guatemalan immigrants in the 1980s. 19
18
SARAH HELMAN PECK, CONG. RSCH SERV., R44795, “SANCTUARY”
JURISDICTION: FEDERAL, STATE, AND LOCAL POLICIES AND RELATED LITIGATION 3
(2019).
19 Sanctuary Policy FAQ, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES (June 20, 2019),
https://www.ncsl.org/research/immigration/sanctuary-policy-faq635991795.aspx.
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These religious groups offered jobs, legal aid, food, and medical
care to the asylum seekers.20 In 1989, shortly following this wave
of immigrants, San Francisco became the first city to formally
enact what was later labeled a sanctuary policy. 21 The ordinance
prohibited city funds and resources from being used “to assist in
the enforcement of federal immigration law or to gather
information regarding the immigration status of individuals”
within the city unless required by federal or state law. 22
The immigration-related policies that lead to a jurisdiction
being categorized as a sanctuary jurisdiction tend to vary since
there is no explicit definition of the term. 23 Despite the lack of
explicit and standardized sanctuary jurisdiction practices, these
policies fit into some overarching categories that: (1) restrict
police from arresting people based on federal immigration
violations or using civil immigration warrants to detain people;
(2) prohibit 287(g) agreements (agreements between local or
state police and the Department of Homeland Security [“DHS”]
that deputize certain police officers to carry out functions
normally performed by federal immigration agents); 24 (3) prevent
contracts allowing undocumented immigrants to be held in
detention; (4) prevent detention facilities; (5) restrict city officials
from inquiring about one’s immigration status; (6) restrict
sharing undocumented immigrants’ information with the federal
government; (7) restrict responses to detainers; and (8) policies
that do not allow ICE into local jails without a warrant. 25 A
common sanctuary policy is to place restrictions on holding
undocumented immigrants in jails after ICE has issued a detainer
for the individual. 26 A detainer refers to the written request, in
which ICE asks that an arrested individual not be released from
jail for up to forty-eight hours, so ICE can take custody of them. 27
20
21
22
23
24

Id.
Id.
Id.
Sanctuary Policies: An Overview, supra note 6, at 1.
The 287(g) Program: An Overview, AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL, 1 (July 2021),

https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/research/the_287g_p
rogram_an_overview.pdf.
25 Sanctuary Policies: An Overview, supra note 6, at 2–3.
26 Sanctuary Policies: An Overview, supra note 6, at 3.
27
Sanctuary Policy FAQ, NAT’L CONF. STATE LEGISLATURES (June 20, 2019),
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The number of sanctuary jurisdictions has dramatically
increased since San Francisco’s first ordinance in the late 1980s.
Prior to President Obama taking office in 2009, there were only
forty sanctuary jurisdictions throughout the country. 28 By the
2016 election, there were 300 sanctuary jurisdictions. 29 Following
President Trump winning the 2016 election, and prior to his
inauguration, thirty-eight more jurisdictions announced that they
would become sanctuary jurisdictions.30 Within the first year of
President Trump taking office, the number of sanctuary
jurisdictions throughout the country increased to 564. 31
B. The Byrne JAG Program
The Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant
Program provides funding to states and localities to support a
broad range of criminal justice projects. 32 These initiatives
include funding for law enforcement, crime prevention and
education, prosecution, technology improvements, drug
treatment, crime victim and witness assistance, and corrections. 33
The total amount of funding is around $445 million per fiscal
year. 34 The Byrne JAG program is a formula grant, and funding
is determined by a state’s share of the national population and
the state’s number of reported violent crimes. 35 Forty percent of
each state’s grant is then directly given to units of the state’s local
government based on each localities’ proportion of the three-year
average of violent crimes.36 Congress combined the Edward
Byrne Memorial Formula Grant Program and the Local Law
https://www.ncsl.org/research/immigration/sanctuary-policy-faq635991795.aspx.

28
Sanctuary Jurisdictions Nearly Double Since President Trump Promised to
Enforce Our Immigration Laws, FED’N FOR AM. IMMIGR. REFORM, 1 (May 2018),

https://www.fairus.org/sites/default/files/2018-05/Sanctuary-Report-FINAL-2018.pdf.
29
30
31
32

Id.
Id. at 2.
Id.
Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant (JAG) Program: Overview,

BUREAU JUST. ASSISTANCE, https://bja.ojp.gov/program/jag/overview (last visited Oct.
2, 2021).
33

Id.

NATHAN JAMES, CONG. RSCH SERV., IF10691, THE EDWARD BYRNE MEM’L JUST.
ASSISTANCE GRANT (JAG) PROGRAM 2 (2020) [hereinafter NATHAN JAMES].
35 NATHAN JAMES, supra note 34, at 1.
36 NATHAN JAMES, supra note 34, at 1.
34
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Enforcement Block Grant Program to form the current Byrne
JAG program through the Violence Against Women and
Department of Justice Reauthorization Act of 2005. 37 This
consolidation was meant to simplify the application process for
these funding programs. 38
The program is codified in 34 U.S.C. §§ 10151–10158. 39
Grant recipients must certify that the grant-funded programs
meet all the requirements of the statute, all the application
material is correct, “there has been appropriate coordination
with affected agencies” (the “coordination provision”), and “the
applicant will comply with all provisions of this part and all other
applicable Federal laws.” 40 The statute also requires, for each
covered fiscal year, that the recipient “shall maintain and report
such data, records, and information (programmatic and
financial) as the Attorney General may reasonably require” (the
“data or information reporting provision”).41 Additionally, the
Attorney General has a rulemaking provision that allows him to
issue rules to assist in carrying out the program. 42
C. The Challenged Conditions
The phrase “challenged conditions” refers to the three
immigration-related conditions that have been placed on Byrne
JAG funds, which consist of the Certification or Compliance
Condition, the Access Condition, and the Notification
Condition.43
In 2016, an investigation conducted by the
Department of Justice’s (“DOJ”) Inspector General revealed that
there was a significant decline in the cooperation of state and
local entities with federal immigration authorities. 44 As a result of
this report, in July 2016, Attorney General Lynch identified 8
U.S.C. § 1373 as “an applicable Federal law” for Byrne JAG
37
NATHAN JAMES, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RS22416, EDWARD BYRNE MEMORIAL
JUSTICE ASSISTANCE GRANT (JAG) PROGRAM 2 (2013).
38

Id.

New York v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 951 F.3d 84, 92 (2d Cir. 2020).
34 U.S.C. § 10153(a)(5).
41 34 U.S.C. § 10153(a)(4).
42 34 U.S.C. § 10155.
43
SARAH HERMAN PECK, CONG. RSCH. SERV., LSB10126, DOJ GRANT
CONDITIONS TARGETING SANCTUARY JURISDICTIONS: LITIGATION UPDATE 1–2 (2018).
44 New York, 951 F.3d at 98.
39
40
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grants. 45 Under Section 1373, state and local governments
cannot prohibit or restrict any government entity from sending
or receiving information relating to immigration status. 46
Following the transition of the Obama administration to the
Trump administration, Attorney General Sessions released a
notice that there would be three new conditions placed on Byrne
JAG funding grants with the goal of “increas[ing] information
sharing between federal, state, and local law enforcement,
ensuring that federal immigration authorities have the
information they need to enforce immigration laws and keep our
communities safe.” 47
The Compliance Condition requires grant recipients to
certify that they are compliant with 8 U.S.C. § 1373. 48 The Access
Condition requires that immigration enforcement officers have
access to jails and prisons where undocumented immigrants are
housed so that ICE officers can meet with them and inquire if
they are eligible to stay in the country. 49 The Notice Condition
requires that recipients have a policy in place to ensure that DHS
will be notified 48-hours prior to the release of immigrants who
are in the state’s or locality’s custody and wanted for removal
from the United States.50
III.

CIRCUIT COURT SUMMARY

After the Attorney General announced the challenged
conditions would apply to Byrne JAG applications, lawsuits
sprang up all around the country, seeking to enjoin imposing
these conditions on grants. 51 The key issue placed before the
circuits was whether Congress had given statutory authority to
45
46

Id. at 99.

8 U.S.C. § 1373(a).

Attorney General Sessions Announces Immigration Compliance
Requirements for Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant Programs, U.S.
47

DEP’T OF JUST. (July 25, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/attorney-generalsessions-announces-immigration-compliance-requirements-edward-byrnememorial.
48
SARAH HERMAN PECK, CONG. RSCH. SERV., LSB10126, DOJ GRANT
CONDITIONS TARGETING SANCTUARY JURISDICTIONS: LITIGATION UPDATE 1 (2018).
49 Id. at 1–2.
50
51

Id.
Id. at 1.
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the Attorney General to impose these conditions on Byrne JAG
grants. 52 To answer this question, the circuits analyzed whether
this power was granted through the Byrne JAG statute or,
alternatively, by 34 U.S.C. § 10102, which outlines the duties and
functions of the Assistant Attorney General. 53 In addition to
determining if the challenged conditions are statutorily
authorized, the Certification Condition required the courts to
determine whether the Attorney General could mandate
compliance with 8 U.S.C. § 1373 by labeling it as an applicable
federal law. 54
A. Circuits That Have Struck Down the Challenged

Conditions

Four of the five circuits that have decided this issue have
struck down the challenged conditions on the grounds that the
Attorney General did not have statutory authority to implement
them. 55 The Third Circuit was the first to hear this issue about
the challenged conditions’ legality, through a case arising out of
Philadelphia. 56 Philadelphia implemented policies that limited
sharing immigration-related information with federal officials,
limited federal officials’ access to city prisons, and limited the
coordination between federal and city officials with regards to
releasing undocumented immigrants from city custody. 57 The
city defended these policies as necessary to “help foster trust
between the immigrant community and law enforcement.” 58 In
response, DOJ made a preliminary determination of
52
City & Cnty. of S.F. v. Barr, 965 F.3d 753, 759–60 (9th Cir. 2020); City of
Chicago v. Barr, 961 F.3d 882, 891–92 (7th Cir. 2020); City of Providence v. Barr,
954 F.3d 23, 31 (1st Cir. 2020); New York v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 951 F.3d 84, 90 (2d
Cir. 2020); City of Phila. v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 916 F.3d 276, 279 (3d Cir. 2019).
53
City & Cnty. of S.F., 965 F.3d at 760–61; City of Chicago, 961 F.3d at 892–
93; City of Providence, 954 F.3d at 32, 39; New York, 952 F.3d at 101, 104, 116,
121; City of Phila., 916 F.3d at 284–88.
54
City & Cnty. of S.F., 965 F.3d at 761–64; City of Chicago, 961 F.3d at 898;
City of Providence, 954 F.3d at 36–39; New York, 952 F.3d at 105–11; City of
Phila., 916 F.3d at 288–91.
55 City & Cnty. of S.F., 965 F.3d at 757; City of Chicago, 961 F.3d at 887; City
of Providence, 954 F.3d at 27; City of Phila., 916 F.3d at 279.
56 City of Phila., 916 F.3d at 279.
57 Id. at 282.
58

Id.
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Philadelphia’s fiscal year 2017 Byrne JAG application, notifying
the city that several laws, practices, or policies violated 8 U.S.C.
§ 1373. 59 Accordingly, Philadelphia filed a complaint seeking to
enjoin the DOJ from implementing the challenged conditions, as
well as a writ of mandamus compelling the release of the city’s
2017 Byrne JAG funds.60
Philadelphia asserted five arguments in its complaint as to
why it was entitled to relief. 61
First, DOJ violated the
Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) and the separation of
powers doctrine because it did not have the authority to
implement these conditions. 62 Second, the conditions violated
the APA because the conditions were enacted arbitrarily and
capriciously.63 Third, DOJ violated the Spending Clause. 64
Fourth, the Certification Condition, as well as Section 1373,
violated the Tenth Amendment. 65 Fifth, Philadelphia was in
compliance with the conditions.66
The district court first granted a preliminary injunction and
then, at a later time, granted summary judgment for the city on
all claims, as well as a permanent injunction ordering DOJ to
distribute Philadelphia’s grant funding. 67
On appeal, the Third Circuit only addressed whether the
Attorney General had statutory authority to implement the
challenged conditions and did not analyze the city’s other
arguments. 68 The Attorney General asserted three possible
sources of authority to implement the challenged conditions: the
Byrne JAG statute, 34 U.S.C. § 10102(a), which outlined the
duties of the Assistant Attorney General, and 34 U.S.C.
§ 10153(a)(5)(D), which required compliance with “all other
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68

Id.
Id.
Id. at 282–83.
City of Phila., 916 F.3d at 283.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
City of Phila., 916 F.3d at 284. Because the court found that the challenged

conditions exceeded the Attorney General’s statutory authority, it did not have to
make determinations as to Philadelphia’s other arguments. Id. at 291.
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applicable Federal laws,” as authorization for the Certification
Condition.69
First, the Third Circuit looked at whether the Byrne JAG
statute provided authority to implement the Notice and Access
Conditions and ultimately held that it did not. 70 The court
reasoned that, while the statute required data reporting and
coordination between affected agencies, interpreting this to grant
authority for the challenged conditions would stretch the
language “too far.” 71 As for the data reporting provision, the
court explained that it was explicitly limited to only
“programmatic and financial” information, which these
conditions did not involve. 72 The court further reasoned that
because the coordination provision was phrased in the past tense,
stating that there “has been” appropriate coordination, there
were no grounds for imposing ongoing coordination and only
required coordination in connection with the grant application. 73
Additionally, the court explained that the statute and other parts
of the U.S. Code explicitly laid out circumstances when the
Attorney General could withhold or reallocate grant funds, but
these never authorized that the Attorney General could withhold
all grant funds for any reason. 74
Next, the Third Circuit concluded that the Attorney General
did not have authority to implement the challenged conditions
through 34 U.S.C. § 10102(a)(6), which states that the Assistant
Attorney General can “exercise such other powers and functions
as may be vested in the Assistant Attorney General . . . including
placing special conditions on all grants.” 75 The court reasoned
that the plain text of this statute only allowed the Assistant
Attorney General to place special conditions to the extent that
the Attorney General or a statute vested power to him. 76 The
Third Circuit also noted that the five subsections preceding
69
70
71
72

Id. at 284.
Id. at 284–87.
Id. at 285.
Id. Programmatic meaning information related to the grant-funded

programs.
73
74
75
76

Id.
City of Phila., 916 F.3d at 286.
Id. at 287.
Id. at 287–88.

CANEVASCINI (DO NOT DELETE)

150

SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL

3/1/2022 8:49 AM

[Vol. 46:1

subsection six in 34 U.S.C. § 10102(a) 77 were of a ministerial
nature, and it was hesitant to find that the sixth subsection
granted such sweeping power when the statute lacked language
to support such a proposition.78
The Third Circuit further held that 8 U.S.C. § 1373 was not
an applicable law for the purposes of the Certification
Condition.79 According to the court, the term “applicable” was
meant to be narrowly interpreted and not to include all possible
laws that could independently apply to grant applicants. 80
Because the other requirements in 34 U.S.C. § 10153(a)(5) all
relate to grant-funded programs, the court found it reasonable
and correct to interpret that “all other applicable Federal laws”
referred only to laws that apply to grant operations. 81 The court
also looked at DOJ’s historical practices, which were not in line
with such a broad interpretation of “all other applicable Federal
laws.” 82 The Third Circuit additionally noted that allowing the
Attorney General to implement these challenged conditions
would transform the Byrne JAG grant from a formula grant to a

77

78
79
80
81
82

34 U.S.C. § 10102(a)
The Assistant Attorney General shall–(1) publish and disseminate
information on the conditions and progress of the criminal
justice systems; (2) maintain liaison with the executive and
judicial branches of the Federal and State governments in
matters relating to criminal justice; (3) provide information to the
President, the Congress, the judiciary, State and local
governments, and the general public relating to criminal justice;
(4) maintain liaison with public and private educational and
research institutions, State and local governments, and
governments of other nations relating to criminal justice; (5)
coordinate and provide staff support to coordinate the activities
of the Office and the Bureau of Justice Assistance, the National
Institute of Justice, the Bureau of Justice Statistics, the Office for
Victims of Crime, and the Office of Juvenile Justice and
Delinquency Prevention; and (6) exercise such other powers and
functions as may be vested in the Assistant Attorney General
pursuant to this chapter or by delegation of the Attorney
General, including placing special conditions on all grants, and
determining priority purposes for formula grants.
City of Phila., 916 F.3d at 288.
Id. at 291.
Id. at 289.
Id. at 289–90 (quoting 34 U.S.C. § 10153(a)(5)(D)).
Id. at 290.
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discretionary one.83 Allowing the conditions to be upheld would
distort the original purpose and planned distribution of grant
funds that Congress put in place when the grant program was
codified. Utilizing spending conditions in such a way allows the
executive branch to put pressure on states and localities to carry
out the administration’s policies instead of being able to make
policy decisions in the best interest of its jurisdiction.
Following the Third Circuit’s decision, the First Circuit was
next to strike down the challenged conditions.84 This suit arose
from Providence and Central Falls, Rhode Island (“the Cities”). 85
In June 2018, DOJ notified the Cities that it approved their
Byrne JAG applications, and it granted each city $212,112 and
$28,677, respectively. 86 Included in the grant approval letters,
DOJ alerted them that they must comply with the three
challenged conditions to receive their funding.87 The Cities had
sanctuary policies in place that conflicted with these conditions. 88
Both cities enacted policies prohibiting police officers from
retaining custody based only on an immigration detainer or any
other request by federal immigration authorities, absent a
warrant. 89 In Providence, police officers could not inquire about
someone’s immigration status, and Central Falls had a similar
policy in place that prevented officers from stopping or asking
questions based on someone’s immigration status. 90 In response
to DOJ’s notification of the imposed conditions, the Cities sued
DOJ, seeking to enjoin the agency from implementing the
challenged conditions on Byrne JAG grants for 2017. 91
The Cities asserted three arguments that overlapped with
several of Philadelphia’s arguments in City of Philadelphia v.
Att’y Gen. of the United States. 92 The Cities argued that DOJ
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92

Id.

City of Providence v. Barr, 954 F.3d 23, 45 (1st Cir. 2020).
Id. at 26.
Id. at 29.
Id. at 29–30.
Id. at 30.

Id.
City of Providence, 954 F.3d at 30.
Id.
Compare City of Providence, 954 F.3d at 30 (“In relevant part, the Cities

alleged that the DOJ did not possess statutory authority to impose the challenged
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lacked statutory authority to implement the challenged
conditions, that the implementation of the conditions was
arbitrary and capricious, and that the conditions were
unconstitutional. 93 The district court found that DOJ did not
have statutory authority and granted summary judgment for the
Cities, as well as a permanent injunction. 94 On appeal, DOJ
argued that statutory authorization came from either the Byrne
JAG statute or the duties and functions provision for the Assistant
Attorney General. 95
The First Circuit held that the Byrne JAG statute itself did
not allow DOJ to impose the challenged conditions on grant
recipients.96 First, the court reasoned that the information
reporting provision contained within 34 U.S.C. § 10153(a)(4) did
not give the Attorney General authority. 97 While grant recipients
are required to report both programmatic and fiscal information
to the federal government, the court noted that the actions
required by the challenged conditions did not fall into the
category of programmatic information.98 Unlike the Third
Circuit, the court outlined the more convincing interpretation of
programmatic information, defining it as information and data
relating to the Byrne JAG grant itself or the programs funded by
the grant. 99 Then, the court addressed whether the coordination
provision contained in 34 U.S.C. § 10153(a)(5)(C) authorized the
challenged conditions. 100 Based on the statutory construction,
specifically Congress’s usage of the past tense, the court
conditions, that the imposition of the challenged conditions was arbitrary and
capricious, and that the challenged conditions were unconstitutional.”), with City of
Phila. v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 916 F.3d 276, 282–83 (3d Cir. 2019) (“The City
argued that . . . the Department acted ultra vires in enacting the Challenged
Conditions in violation of the [APA]" and the Constitution's separation of powers;
the Conditions were enacted arbitrarily and capriciously in violation of the APA;
they violated the Spending Clause of the Constitution; the Certification Condition
and Section 1373 violated the Tenth Amendment of the Constitution; and the City
was, in fact, in substantial compliance with the Challenged Conditions.”).
93 City of Providence, 954 F.3d at 30.
94
95
96
97
98
99
100

Id.
Id. at 31.
See id. at 35.
City of Providence, 954 F.3d at 32.
Id.
Id. at 33; City of Phila., 916 F.3d at 285.
City of Providence, 954 F.3d at 33.
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interpreted the statutory language as requiring proper
coordination with affected agencies prior to the grant application
being submitted, akin to the Third Circuit’s interpretation. 101
Additionally, the court reasoned that coordination need only
occur with agencies that will be receiving grant funding. 102 The
court further noted that interpreting the information and
coordination provisions as broadly as DOJ argued would
destabilize the statutory formula of the grant since the statutory
formula did not allow the imposition of “brute force conditions”
unrelated to the grant’s purpose. 103
The First Circuit also held that 8 U.S.C. § 1373 did not
qualify as an “applicable Federal law.” 104 The court noted that
the Second Circuit’s holding that the statute qualified as
applicable was too broad of an interpretation and would
effectively eliminate the term “applicable” from the statute. 105
Instead, the court determined that “applicable Federal laws” was
meant to include only laws that “apply to states and localities in
their capacities as Byrne JAG grant recipients.” 106 Additionally,
the court warned that DOJ’s interpretation would grant the
agency significant discretion to deviate from the formula
established in the statute in order to carry out its own agenda,
going against Congress’s intent. 107
Finally, the First Circuit debunked what it believed was
DOJ’s strongest argument, concluding that 34 U.S.C.
§ 10102(a)(2) did not authorize the challenged conditions.108 The
court reasoned that the provision’s mention of the Assistant
Attorney General having the ability to “plac[e] special conditions
on all grants” was meant as an example of a function he could
exercise only when the power has been vested in him through the
statute. 109 Granting the Assistant Attorney General the power to
place these conditions based upon his own priorities would
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109

Id.
Id. at 34.
Id.
Id. at 37.
Id. at 37, 39.
City of Providence, 954 F.3d at 39.
Id.
Id. at 32, 39.
Id. at 41.
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contradict the formulaic nature of the Byrne JAG program, and if
Congress had intended this kind of discretion, it would have
provided for it explicitly. 110
A month after the First Circuit’s decision, the Seventh
Circuit issued its ruling on the challenged conditions.111 This case
resulted from two consolidated cases that arose in Chicago,
Illinois.112 Chicago had in place a sanctuary policy called the
“Welcoming City Ordinance,” which conflicted with the
challenged conditions and, therefore, interfered with the city’s
ability to obtain Byrne JAG funding for the 2017 fiscal year. 113
The Ordinance prohibited disclosing or requesting information
related to immigration status and detaining someone based on a
belief about their immigration status alone or detainers for
“violations of civil immigration laws.” 114
Additionally, the
Ordinance prohibited ICE agents from accessing detainees,
conducting investigative interviews, or allowing police officers to
respond to ICE requests or share information about custody
status or release dates. 115
The City of Chicago sued the Attorney General, arguing, as
the prior cities had, that there was no statutory authority for the
conditions, the conditions violated the Spending Clause, and 8
U.S.C. § 1373 was unconstitutional under anticommandeering. 116
The district court granted summary judgment for Chicago,
finding that 8 U.S.C. § 1373 was unconstitutional under
anticommandeering, the conditions exceeded the Attorney
General’s statutory authority, and the statute violated the
separation of powers.117
In line with the Third and First Circuits, the Seventh Circuit
found that the Attorney General did not have statutory authority
to impose the Notice and Access Conditions through 34 U.S.C.
§ 10102(a)(6). 118 The court was in consensus with its previously
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118

Id. at 41–42.

City of Chicago v. Barr, 961 F.3d 882, 882, 931 (7th Cir. 2020).

Id. at 886.
Id. at 889.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 889–90.
City of Chicago, 961 F.3d at 890.
Id. at 894.
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mentioned sister circuits that, when looking at the plain language
of this subsection, it was clear that the Assistant Attorney General
could exercise certain powers, such as placing special conditions
on grants, but only when the statute had vested it or through a
delegation of power. 119 Furthermore, because the Byrne JAG
grant program was a formula grant, allowing this type of power
to fully deny grants would depart from the intended function of
the program. 120
Next, the Seventh Circuit held that “all other applicable
Federal law” should not be broadly interpreted to include Section
1373, but it did not rule on the statute’s constitutionality. 121 The
court rejected the Attorney General’s interpretation that this
provision included all federal statutes that apply to states because
it would make the words “other applicable” in statutes
superfluous. 122 When looking at the five other subsections, the
court noted it was clear that they relate to the grant’s application
and requirements. 123 Taking the preceding subsections into
consideration, the most logical reading of the sixth subsection
was that “all other applicable Federal law” meant federal laws
that relate to grants and grantees. 124 Similar to the Third Circuit,
the Seventh Circuit looked at the subsequent subchapters of the
Byrne JAG statute and reasoned that they used similar language
in reference to grant recipients, but not laws that generally apply
to states. 125
Unlike previous decisions striking down the challenged
conditions, the Seventh Circuit identified four specific issues with
the Attorney General’s broad interpretation and clarified how it
would conflict with the principle of separation of powers.126 First,
allowing the Attorney General to impose conditions, like the
challenged conditions, would give him the power to implement
conditions that Congress has declined to implement. 127 Second,
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127

Id. at 893.
Id.
Id. at 898.
Id.
City of Chicago, 961 F.3d at 899.
Id.
See id. at 899–901.
Id. at 902.
Id.
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allowing the Attorney General to impose qualifying conditions at
his own discretion would change the formula grant into a
discretionary grant. 128 Third, this interpretation contradicts other
portions of the Byrne JAG statute and raises constitutionality
concerns.129 Fourth, this interpretation conflicts with another
provision of the Byrne JAG statute that prohibits any federal
agency or department from exercising control over any state
police force or criminal justice agency. 130 The court’s concern
shows that this issue goes further than statutory interpretation,
and requires consideration of the ramifications of upholding the
challenged conditions.
The most recent circuit decision regarding the challenged
conditions comes from the Ninth Circuit. 131 San Francisco
expected to receive $923,401 as a sub-grant from California’s
Byrne JAG application and $524,845 as a direct grant from San
Francisco’s application. 132 The City and County of San Francisco
self-identify as sanctuary jurisdictions, enacting policies that limit
city employees from assisting federal immigration law
enforcement. 133 San Francisco sued DOJ in August 2017, seeking
to enjoin implementation of the challenged conditions and
declaratory relief—asking the court to narrowly interpret 8
U.S.C. § 1373 under which their jurisdictions’ sanctuary laws
would comply with the statute. 134
San Francisco argued that the challenged conditions lacked
statutory authorization, violated the Spending Clause, and
violated the APA.135
Additionally, the City argued the
constitutionality of 8 U.S.C. § 1373, claiming that it violated the
Tenth Amendment, and, in the alternative, its policies complied
with the statute when appropriately construed. 136 The district
court granted summary judgment for San Francisco, holding that
the challenged conditions and 8 U.S.C. § 1373 were
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136

Id.
City of Chicago, 961 F.3d at 902.
Id. at 902, 908.

City and Cnty. of S.F. v. Barr, 965 F.3d 753, 753 (9th Cir. 2020).

Id. at 758.
Id. at 757.
Id. at 759.
Id.
Id.
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unconstitutional. 137
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit agreed with the sister circuits,
finding that the Attorney General was not statutorily authorized
to implement the Access and Notice Conditions under 34 U.S.C.
§ 10102(a)(6). 138 The court relied on precedent to hold that,
while the Attorney General is allowed to place special conditions
on grants and determine priority purposes pertaining to formula
grants, the Access and Notice Conditions did not qualify as
“special conditions” or “priority purposes.” 139
The Ninth Circuit’s decision went one step further than
prior circuit decisions by providing a working definition for
“special conditions” and “priority purposes.” 140 In City of Los
Angeles v. Barr, the court interpreted “special conditions” to
mean individualized requirements, such as conditions for highrisk grantees. 141 The court noted that to qualify as a “priority
purpose,” the purpose must be one of the Byrne JAG program’s
proposed purposes. 142 The court explained that the conditions
were not individually tailored in the way that fell under the
definition of special conditions because all grant recipients were
required to comply with the Access and Notice Conditions. 143
Additionally, the court noted that the conditions did not qualify
under priority purposes because the Notice and Access
Conditions were not one of the articulated purposes of the Byrne
JAG grant program. 144
Additionally, the court found that the Access and Notice
Conditions were not authorized through the information
reporting and coordination provisions within the Byrne JAG
statute. 145 Relying again on City of Los Angeles, the circuit court
reasoned that interpreting these provisions to authorize the

137
138
139

2019)).
140
141
142
143
144
145

City & Cnty. of S.F., 965 F.3d at 760.
Id. at 761.
Id. at 760–61 (citing City of L.A. v. Barr, 941 F.3d 931, 939–44 (9th Cir.
City of L.A., 941 F.3d at 941, 942.
Id. at 941.
Id. at 942.
Id.
Id.
City & Cnty. of S.F., 965 F.3d at 761.

CANEVASCINI (DO NOT DELETE)

158

SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL

3/1/2022 8:49 AM

[Vol. 46:1

challenged conditions would exceed the statutory language. 146 In
City of Los Angeles, the Ninth Circuit did not consider it
“‘programmatic’ information” because information about the
release of detained immigrants did not relate to programs
funded by Byrne JAG. 147 The circuit court further held that the
coordination provision did not authorize the challenged
conditions because the statute did not require “an ongoing
obligation” to coordinate with affected agencies “throughout the
life” of the grant’s duration. 148
Unlike other circuit courts, the Ninth Circuit did not
determine whether the Certification Condition was statutorily
authorized; instead, it found that San Francisco’s sanctuary laws
complied with 8 U.S.C. § 1373 and, therefore, satisfied the
Certification Condition.149 The Ninth Circuit also departed from
its sister circuits in interpreting Section 1373. It interpreted the
Section narrowly, determining that it applied only to
“‘immigration status’” or “‘a person’s legal classification under
federal law.’” 150 San Francisco’s sanctuary policies prohibited the
sharing of release-related information, such as release dates,
release status, and contact information, as well as local police
responding to ICE requests about the release of detainees.151 The
court found that while these policies restricted the release of
certain information to federal immigration authorities, the
information being restricted did not relate to immigration status
or immigration classification and, therefore, did not conflict with
the Ninth Circuit’s narrow interpretation of Section 1373. 152
B. Circuit That Has Upheld the Challenged Conditions
The Second Circuit is the only circuit to uphold the
challenged conditions, creating the circuit split. 153 The court
addressed the issue in a case where the State of New York was set
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153

Id.
City of L.A., 941 F.3d at 945.
Id.
City & Cnty. of S.F., 965 F.3d at 764.
Id. at 763 (quoting U.S. v. Cal., 921 F.3d 865, 891 (9th Cir. 2019)).
Id. at 763–64.
Id. at 764.
New York v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 951 F.3d 84, 123 (2d Cir. 2020).
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to receive $25 million in Byrne JAG grants, contingent on their
compliance with the challenged conditions. 154 On two separate
occasions, DOJ also informed New York City that they had
policies in place that violated Section 1373, which rendered them
ineligible to receive Byrne JAG funding. 155 In response, the State
and City of New York sued DOJ, challenging the conditions as
unconstitutional and violative of the APA. 156 The district court
granted New York’s summary judgment motion and found that
the conditions violated the APA, lacked statutory authority, and
that 8 U.S.C. § 1373 violated the Tenth Amendment’s
anticommandeering principle. 157
The Second Circuit began its analysis by agreeing with the
previous circuits on the point that 34 U.S.C. § 10102(a)(6) did
not, by itself, grant the authority to impose the challenged
conditions.158 The court reasoned that the use of the word
“‘including,’” prior to the phrase “placing special conditions on
all grants, and determining priority purposes for formula
grants[,]” signaled that the latter consisted of illustrative
examples rather than expansions of the Attorney General’s
power. 159 As other circuits explained, while it was a power that
could be exercised by the Assistant Attorney General, it was one
that must be vested or delegated to him. 160
The Second Circuit found that the Certification Condition
was statutorily authorized through 34 U.S.C. § 10153(a)(5)(D),
which is the provision that states that grant applicants must
comply with “‘all other applicable Federal laws.’” 161 The court
interpreted the statute as allowing the Attorney General to
determine not only the form or “style” of a grant applicant’s
certification but also “the specificity of its content[.]” 162 The
Second Circuit relied on two dictionary definitions of
“applicable” to inform its statutory interpretation and concluded
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162

Id. at 100.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 101–02.
New York, 951 F.3d at 101–02 (quoting 34 U.S.C. § 10102(a)(6)).
Id. at 102.
Id. at 104 (quoting 34 U.S.C § 10153(a)(5)(D)).
Id. at 105.
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that an “applicable Federal law” was one that related to the grant
recipient or the grant itself. 163 Additionally, the usage of “all” did
not show an intent that the phrase should be narrowly
construed. 164
Next, the court rejected the Third Circuit’s
concerns that this interpretation created a surplusage or
redundancy problem because it reasoned that the use of the
modifier “‘applicable’” served a limiting function. 165 The fact that
Byrne JAG was a formula grant did not mean that this phrase
needed to be narrowly construed because formula grant
recipients have to satisfy certain requirements prior to receiving
funding. 166 This differs from how the other circuits interpreted
this statute because it allows for the Attorney General to require
compliance with a broader range of statutes than other circuits
would have allowed.
The court further explained that Section 1373 did not
conflict with 34 U.S.C. § 10228, which prohibits federal agencies
or officers from exercising control or direction over any state
police. 167 While Section 1373 prevented state authorities from
prohibiting the sharing of information relating to citizenship and
immigration status with federal immigration officials, it did not
require federal supervision or control over the “day-to-day
operations” of state police or even mandate state police
compliance with federal immigration officials. 168 The court found
that DOJ’s history of focusing on laws that pertain to grants
themselves and not grant recipients when determining what laws
are applicable did not mean that the subsection needed to be
limited to those laws only. 169
Finally, the Second Circuit
explained that this condition was not ambiguous, and applicants
had clear notice that they must include a certification to comply
with “all other applicable Federal laws,” and, here, the plaintiffs
were given explicit notice that they must comply with Section
1373. 170
163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170

Id. at 106.
Id.
New York , 951 F.3d at 106–07.
Id. at 107.
Id. at 108.
Id. at 108–09.
Id. at 109.
Id. at 110.
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The Second Circuit further held that Section 1373 was not a
commandeering violation under the Tenth Amendment, as it
applied to federal spending. 171 Congress is allowed to place
conditions on federal funding, and it does not create a
commandeering problem if the state has “a legitimate choice
whether to accept the federal conditions in exchange for federal
funds.” 172 Byrne JAG funding constituted less than 0.1% of New
York’s annual budget. 173 Coercion did not occur in this situation
because the loss of Byrne JAG funding did not represent a
significant percentage of annual budgets. 174
The Second Circuit next held that the Notice Condition was
statutorily authorized by the reporting requirement under 34
U.S.C. § 10153(a)(4).175 The court concluded that the sharing of
release information, as required by the Notice Condition,
qualified as “programmatic” information. 176
The court
determined that programmatic information related to programs
funded by Byrne JAG grants that have to do with prosecution,
incarceration, or release of individuals—since some will inevitably
be people who are removable from the United States. 177 This
interpretation of “programmatic” information is the broadest
interpretation by any circuit and has the potential to include a
wide range of state or local law enforcement information.
The Second Circuit found additional statutory authorization
for the Notice Condition through the coordination provision
under 34 U.S.C. § 10153(a)(5)(C).178 The court disagreed with
the Third Circuit’s interpretation that coordination did not need
to continue into the future. 179 Like it did for “applicable,” the
court relied on the dictionary definition of “coordination” to
inform its interpretation, determining that coordination referred
to establishing how a relationship will function, going forward, to
171
172
173
174
175
176
177
178
179

New York, 951 F.3d at 111.
Id. at 115 (quoting NFIB v. Sibelius, 567 U.S. 519, 578 (2012)).
New York, 951 F.3d at 116.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 117.
Id. at 117–18.
Id. at 116–18.
New York, 951 F.3d at 118.
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accomplish effective results. 180 Coordination must occur prior to
the grant application being filed, but it is deemed “appropriate”
when the state establishes a relationship with the federal
government and “the sequence of their conduct throughout the
grant period.” 181 The court further explained that DHS qualified
as an affected agency requiring coordination because the usage of
grant funds for programs related to prosecuting, incarcerating,
or releasing undocumented immigrants affected how DHS has to
perform its statutory duties. 182
The Second Circuit further found that the Access Condition
was also statutorily authorized under the coordination provision
in 34 U.S.C. § 10153(a)(5)(C). 183 Relying on its earlier reasoning
for how the Notice Condition was authorized through the
coordination provision, the court explained that, in order for
DHS to carry out its statutory duty, it needed to know which
individuals were removable from the United States, making it an
affected agency. 184
Access to facilities was “appropriate
coordination” because it allowed the grant recipient and the
affected agency—DHS—to conduct their duties “in an orderly
sequence.” 185
Additionally, the Notice and Access Conditions were both
statutorily authorized by 34 U.S.C. § 10155. 186 This section of the
Byrne JAG statute allowed the Attorney General to issue rules on
how the Byrne Program requirements will be carried out. 187
The Second Circuit took its analysis further than the other
circuits in being the only one to determine whether the
conditions violated the APA. 188 The court concluded that the
challenged conditions were not arbitrary and capricious and,
therefore, did not violate the APA.189 The standard for when an
agency acts in an arbitrary and capricious manner is when it
180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187
188
189

Id.
Id. at 119.
Id.
Id. at 121.
Id.
New York , 951 F.3d at 121.
Id. at 120–22.
Id. at 121.
Id. at 122–24.
Id.
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“entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem”
at hand. 190 The court reasoned that the fact that DOJ did not
discuss the detrimental effects of the Certification Condition did
not meet this standard. 191 Additionally, the Notice and Access
Conditions did not reach this standard because they were applied
against people in the state’s custody, so they were unlikely to
cause detriments and, therefore, did not require discussion.192
IV.

ANALYSIS

A. The Access and Notice Conditions Are Not Statutorily

Authorized

All circuits that have ruled on the challenged conditions
agree that 34 U.S.C. § 10102(a)(6) does not provide statutory
authority for the Attorney General to impose Access and Notice
Conditions on Byrne JAG grants. 193 This lack of authority is
evident by a reading of the statute’s plain language. Specifically,
Congress placed the word “including” preceding “placing special
conditions on all grants.” 194 This phrasing indicates that, while
this subsection intends to illustrate the kinds of power the
Attorney General can exercise under this statute, it does not
bestow upon the Attorney General the power to place any special
conditions on any grants. 195 Additionally, as most circuits have
articulated, the authority in this subsection limits the Assistant
Attorney General to powers already vested in the Attorney
General through a delegation of power or through the statute
itself. 196
It logically follows that none of the circuits found statutory
190 New York, 951 F.3d at 122 (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc.
v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)).
191 New York, 951 F.3d at 122.
192 Id. at 123.
193
City & Cnty. of S.F. v. Barr, 965 F.3d 753, 761 (9th Cir. 2020); City of
Chicago v. Barr, 961 F.3d 882, 894 (7th Cir. 2020); City of Providence v. Barr, 954
F.3d 23, 45 (1st Cir. 2020); New York, 951 F.3d at 101; City of Phila. v. Att’y Gen.
of the U.S., 916 F.3d 276, 287–88 (3d Cir. 2019).
194 34 U.S.C. § 10102(a)(6) (2017).
195 New York, 951 F.3d at 102.
196
City of Chicago, 961 F.3d at 894; City of Providence, 954 F.3d at 45; New
York, 951 F.3d at 101–02; City of Phila., 916 F.3d at 287–88.
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authorization through this particular statute. Allowing 34 U.S.C.
§ 10102(a)(6) to function as statutory authorization may have
been the most dangerous precedent the circuits could have set.
Interpreting this illustrative phrase in this manner would allow
the Attorney General unfettered discretion to place any condition
on federal grants. While other constitutional and statutory
safeguards exist that could limit this power, the Attorney General
could still use this authority to carry out the administration’s
regulatory agenda by leveraging funding upon which states and
localities rely. States could not rely on commandeering to
protect their funds from being held hostage in most situations
because of the high standard required to show coercion.197 If it
were to be contingent upon these conditions, only states and
localities supportive of the administration’s policies would be
eligible for federal funding.
There is no statutory authorization for the Notice and Access
Conditions through the information reporting provision under
34 U.S.C. § 10153(a)(4). To justify the Notice Condition under
this provision, the Second Circuit explained that sharing release
information qualifies as “programmatic” information because the
grant-funded programs will involve individuals who are
removable from the United States. 198
This interpretation,
however, conflicts with the usage of the word “program”
throughout the Byrne JAG statute. As the First Circuit states,
throughout the statute, “program” refers to the Byrne JAG grant
program itself, along with the specific activities and programs the
grant funds. 199 The Third Circuit’s view further supports this
proposition, holding that the information reporting provision
only includes “information regarding the handling of federal
funds and the programs to which those funds are directed.” 200
The Ninth Circuit’s precedent echoes a similar interpretation. 201
The Second Circuit’s interpretation, that release information
qualifies as “programmatic information,” stretches the phrase
beyond what Congress intended, and deviates from the previous
197
198
199
200
201

See NFIB v. Sibelius, 567 U.S. 519, 578–80 (2012).
New York, 951 F.3d at 117.
City of Providence, 954 F.3d at 32.
City of Phila., 916 F.3d at 285.
See City of L.A. v. Barr, 941 F.3d 931, 945 (9th Cir. 2019).
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understanding of the term.
To permit such a broad
interpretation of this term would open the door to allowing the
executive branch to effectively put in place policies that Congress
has declined. This raises serious federalism concerns because the
federal government could now have a troubling level of
involvement in, and oversight of, state and local police. By
allowing the executive branch to make these decisions, there
would be a lack of democratic accountability, since Congress is
elected to make these kinds of policy decisions.
There is no statutory authorization for the Notice and Access
Conditions through the coordination provision under 34 U.S.C.
§ 10153(a)(5)(C). One contributing factor to this determination
is that Congress chose to use past tense verbiage when stating
that there “has been appropriate coordination with affected
agencies.” 202 This tense choice, as the First Circuit pointed out,
supports the view that Congress intended for grant applicants to
show that coordination with affected agencies had taken place
prior to submission of the Byrne JAG grant application. 203 The
Third Circuit articulates a similar, and logical, interpretation that
applicants must certify “that there was appropriate coordination
in connection with the grantee’s application,” and the subsection
does not impose the requirement of ongoing coordination in
matters unrelated to grant funding. 204
The coordination provision does not act as statutory
authorization, contrary to the Second Circuit’s opinion. 205 There,
the court interpreted that “appropriate coordination” did not
only include conduct prior to grant submission, but also dictated
future conduct. 206 The Second Circuit interpreted the subsection
language to mean establishing a relationship that determines
future conduct throughout the grant period by relying on the
dictionary definition of “coordination.” 207 The Second Circuit is
202
203
204
205

2020).
206
207

34 U.S.C. § 10153(a)(5)(C).

City of Providence, 954 F.3d at 33.
City of Phila., 916 F.3d at 285.
But see New York v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 951 F.3d 84, 116, 121 (2d Cir.
Id. at 118.
Id. at 118–19.
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correct in its determination that DHS would qualify as an
“affected agency” for purposes of the subsection because
programs funded by these grants do affect how DHS carries out
its statutory duties. 208 However, while DHS may be an “affected
agency,” interpreting this provision for the future—beyond prior
grant submissions—directly contradicts the past tense language
Congress chose to utilize when drafting this statute.
Specifically, the usage of the Notice and Access Conditions to
influence state and local immigration policy decisions adds
complexity to an already complicated balance of power between
the states and federal government when it comes to the area of
immigration.
The precedent of NFIB v. Sibelius and
commandeering cannot be used to protect states because the
amount of funding does not reach the point where a choice has
been taken away from the states when deciding between the grant
and its immigration policy. 209 Although the funding conditions
cannot be seen as coercion by the courts, they are effectively
having this result on jurisdictions depriving states and localities
of making policy decisions for how they would like to handle
non-citizens within its jurisdiction. 210
While only one circuit court has upheld the usage of these
conditions, there is reason to be concerned about the kind of
precedent being set. Allowing the sharing of release information
opens the door to requiring states to report to the federal
government a broad array of information that pertains to day-today police operations. This raises serious federalism concerns
because the federal government could now have a troubling level
of involvement and oversight of state and local police relying on
this precedent. While oversight and information sharing are
necessary in some specific instances, too much oversight will
remove state and localities’ autonomy and freedom in
determining how to best police its jurisdiction.211
Id. at 119.
See supra notes 174, 199 and accompanying text.
210
See Daisy Contreras, Comment, The End of “Sanctuary Cities” or the End
of the Separation of Powers?: An Analysis of the Executive Branch’s Misuse of the
Spending Power to Crack Down on Sanctuary Cities, 52 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 847,
208
209

871-72 (2020) (discussing how grant preferences effectively denied funding from
sanctuary cities).
211
See generally Peter J. Boettke, Liya Palagashvili, & Ennio E. Piano,

CANEVASCINI (DO NOT DELETE)

2022]

3/1/2022 8:49 AM

COMMENT

167

B. The Certification Condition is Statutorily Authorized
While the Notice and Access Conditions are not statutorily
authorized, the Certification Condition does have statutory
authorization for the Attorney General to apply it to Byrne JAG
grant funding. The provision under 34 U.S.C. § 10153(a)(5)(D)
requires grant applicants to certify that they will comply with the
Byrne JAG requirements and “all other applicable Federal
laws.” 212 As the Second Circuit explained, the statute allows the
Attorney General to determine the form and specificity of grant
applicants’ certification. 213 This favors the interpretation that the
Attorney General would have the power to specify which laws
would qualify as “other applicable Federal laws.” Other circuits
opt for a narrow interpretation that would exclude Section 1373
because they believe this subsection refers to laws applying to
states and cities in their capacities as grant recipients and not as
independent entities.214 As the Second Circuit points out, a plain
reading of the statute’s language better supports that an
“applicable Federal law” can pertain to either the grant applicant
or the grant being sought. 215
Circuits have adopted a narrower interpretation due to other
concerns. The Third Circuit asserts that a narrow construction is
necessary to avoid implicating the canon against surplusage,
which would allow all possible laws that could independently

Federalism and the Police: An Applied Theory of “Fiscal Attention”, 49 ARIZ. ST. L.

J. 907 (2017) (discussing the effect that federal oversight has on local police); Veena
Dubal, The Demise of Community Policing? The Impact of Post-9/11 Federal
Surveillance Programs on Local Enforcement, 19 ASIAN AM. L. J. 35 (2012)
(discussing how post-9/11 federal policing initiatives affect local law enforcement).
212 34 U.S.C. § 10153(a)(5)(D).
213 New York, 951 F.3d at 105.
214 City of Chicago v. Barr, 961 F.3d 882, 899 (7th Cir. 2020); City of Phila. v.
Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 916 F.3d 276, 289 (3d Cir. 2019); City of Providence v. Barr,
954 F.3d 23, 39 (1st Cir. 2020).
215 New York, 951 F.3d at 106.
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apply to the grant applicant to qualify. 216 This concern, however,
is not relevant because the usage of “applicable” limits the laws
that could possibly apply to these grant applications and
applicants. 217 Additionally, several circuits raise concerns that
allowing this condition contravenes the formalistic nature of the
Byrne JAG Program and have it, instead, function on a
conditional basis.218 While this is a valid concern, a grant that
requires meeting certain conditions does not necessarily mean
that the grant is no longer a formulaic grant. This argument is
adequately addressed by the fact that formulaic grant applicants
still have to satisfy requirements specific to the grant prior to
receiving funding.219
Additionally, requiring grant recipients to certify compliance
with Section 1373 would not prevent states and localities from
implementing some sanctuary policies in their respective
jurisdictions.
Section 1373 only prohibits state and local
governments from enacting policies that restrict information
sharing “regarding the citizenship or immigration status” of
undocumented immigrants. 220 This, however, does not require
government officials to collect information about citizenship or
immigration status, prohibit policies that restrict compliance with
detainers, or prohibit policies that will limit information sharing
related to criminal case information, release dates, or custody
status. 221 Additionally, as seen in City and County of San
Francisco, courts would be able to adopt either a broad or narrow
interpretation of Section 1373 when determining whether a
specific jurisdiction’s policies conflict with the statute. 222
C. Greater Federalism Implications
The precedent of upholding these challenged conditions
could stretch much further than immigration policies. Allowing
these conditions means that the federal government can put
216
217
218
219
220
221
222

City of Phila., 916 F.3d at 289.
New York, 951 F.3d at 106.
City of Phila., 916 F.3d at 290; City of Providence, 954 F.3d at 42.
New York, 951 F.3d at 107.
8 U.S.C. § 1373.

See Sanctuary Policies: An Overview, supra note 6, at 3.
See City & Cnty. of S.F. v. Barr, 965 F.3d 753, 761 (9th Cir. 2020).
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pressure on states and localities to follow its agenda across a
broad array of policy issues.
A possible parallel can be seen between the usage of funding
conditions to influence immigration policy and states that have
legalized marijuana. 223 The legalization of marijuana is an area of
the law, similar to immigration, where tension exists between
some states’ policies and the federal government. During the
Trump administration, there were concerns that Attorney
General Sessions would withhold funding to states that had
legalized marijuana, having a similar effect that the challenged
conditions had on sanctuary jurisdictions, although there was
ultimately no such action taken. 224 While the current tension
between federal and state approaches to marijuana may be
resolved during the Biden administration, if it is not, future
administrations can possibly utilize funding conditions similar to
the challenged conditions to influence changes in states’
marijuana policies. The legalization of marijuana is just one
example of the numerous possibilities in which grant funding
conditions could be used to influence state and local policy
decisions. Any area of the law where there is a conflict between
states’ policies and the executive branch could become vulnerable
to this kind of manipulation. Issues such as abortion, energy
policies, criminal justice reform, and, even more recently,
vaccine-related regulations just scratch the surface of areas where
the executive branch could decide to implement conditions that
would put state funding in jeopardy if it does not follow the
executive branch’s approach.
The issue is not the usage of conditions on spending to
influence state and local policy decisions but, rather, the fact that
these are conditions put in place by the executive branch without
having gone through Congress. Interpretations like the Second
Circuit’s in determining that the Notice and Access Conditions
are statutorily authorized stretches the statute beyond what
Congress originally intended. Allowing this kind of precedent
places a power with the executive branch that could be easily
Arlen Gharibian, Weed Whacking Through the Tenth Amendment:
Navigating a Trump Administration Threat to Withhold Funding From MarijuanaFriendly States, 52 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 275, 284 (2019).
224 Id.
223
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abused to push administration policies where Congress has
chosen not to enact legislation.
While the usage of spending conditions to put pressure on
sanctuary jurisdictions to make changes, on its face, would
probably not be met with backlash from conservatives, the
precedent this practice sets is one that should concern both sides
of the aisle. As this section discusses, precedent to allow
conditions like the challenged conditions has the potential to
take away state autonomy in making policy decisions for its
jurisdiction.
Additionally, while these cases involved a
Republican executive branch implementing conditions against
jurisdictions with what are seen as liberal policies, the situation
can be easily reversed when a Democrat is in control of the
executive branch. In conclusion, while this line of cases may not
concern conservatives, the greater federalism issues and possible
expansions this kind of precedent would provide should cause
them just as much concern as their Democratic colleagues.
V.

CONCLUSION

The circuit split that has developed over the challenged
conditions’ legality focuses on whether the Attorney General has
statutory authorization to implement these conditions. The First,
Third, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits have all struck down the
challenged conditions on the grounds that the Attorney General
lacks the necessary authorization. The Second Circuit takes the
alternative position and upholds all three conditions, finding
authorization from the statute that outlines the duties and
functions of the Assistant Attorney General. This Comment
concludes that the Access and Notice Conditions are not
statutorily authorized through either the “Duties and Functions
of Assistant Attorney General” provision in 34 U.S.C.
§ 10102(a)(6), or the information reporting or coordination
provisions of the Byrne JAG statute codified at 34 U.S.C.
§ 10153(a)(4) and (a)(5)(C), respectfully.
These conditions
overstep the federal government’s role, as well as the Attorney
General’s power, raising serious federalism concerns. By contrast,
the Certification Condition is statutorily authorized through 34
U.S.C. § 10153(a)(5)(D) and 8 U.S.C. § 1373 and qualifies as an
“applicable Federal law.” Upholding the Certification Condition
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does not mean that sanctuary jurisdictions cannot continue to
implement their policies, but rather requires courts to interpret
exactly what kinds of immigration policies can exist in harmony
with the condition.

